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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence that the Italian public finances are sustainable, as the 
country meets its intertemporal budget constraint. Nevertheless, the burden of 
correcting budgetary disequilibria is entirely carried by changes in taxes, which can 
have some detrimental economic effects, rather than changes in government 
spending or policy mixes. Our non-linear analysis, in particular, shows that taxes 
adjust more rapidly when deviations from the equilibrium level get larger, and that they 
are downward inflexible not only with respect to their long-run level, but also during 
periods of decreasing economic growth. In order to correct the undesirable trend of 
high fiscal pressure and high public debt in Italy, structural expenditure reforms aiming 
at a higher degree of government expenditure adjustment are needed. This would 
also relax the asymmetries reported in the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
The most remarkable feature of Italian public finances is the simultaneous 
presence of high fiscal pressure and high public debt. The latter rose from around 
41% of GDP in the late 1950s to around 124% of GDP in 1994, only to fall to 110% of 
GDP in 2000, representing the highest value among the EU countries. At the same 
time, fiscal pressure in Italy is higher than the OECD average; in particular, the taxes 
to GDP ratio is currently 43.3% for Italy, compared with an OECD average of 37.3% 
and a European average of 39.9%. Our paper, by proposing the adoption of non-
linear error correction models in public finance analysis, provides an explanation of 
this feature within the revenue-expenditure models. 
A detailed analysis of the relationship between the Italian public expenditures 
and revenues is important for economic policy purposes, as well as for the attainment 
to the Maastricht and the European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP) criteria. 
Indeed, examining the relationship between general government expenditure and 
revenues can shed some light on the causes and the consequences of fiscal 
disequilibria.  
In particular, we address four main relevant policy questions. First, are the Italian 
public finances meeting their intertemporal budget constraint? Second, is fiscal 
adjustment back to equilibrium equally shared by changes in revenues and 
government spending? Third, is there any evidence of asymmetric and/or non-linear 
fiscal adjustment back to equilibrium? Fourth, does fiscal adjustment vary with the 
state of the economy?  
Unlike previous work on the revenue-expenditure models, we adopt a non-linear 
error correction specification, which allows us to test for possible asymmetries and 
inflexibilities in the use of fiscal instruments. Our proposed approach to the revenue-
spending modeling provides a number of interesting findings. The Italian public 
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finances are sustainable, as there is a long-run relationship between the revenues 
and government spending shares of GDP. Nevertheless, expenditures will constantly 
grow at a higher rate than taxes. The burden of correcting budgetary disequilibria is 
entirely carried by changes in taxes rather than changes in government spending or 
policy mixes. This supports the spend-and-tax hypothesis, pointing to the need of 
expenditure reforms, given the distortionary effect of taxes. We also find that taxes 
adjust more rapidly when deviations from the equilibrium level get larger, as well as 
some weak evidence of downward inflexibility of taxes, when these are above their 
long-run level. Further, taxes increase rapidly during periods of accelerating 
economic growth, but are downward inflexible during periods of decreasing economic 
growth. The policy implication of our findings is that in order to correct the undesirable 
trend of high fiscal pressure and high public debt, necessary structural expenditure 
reforms will need to become a priority in the fiscal agenda of the Italian government. 
These structural reforms, aiming at a higher degree of government expenditure 
adjustment, would also relax the asymmetries reported in our paper. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the revenue-expenditure 
theories. Section 3 estimates the long-run model whereas Section 4 reports 
estimates of the linear, asymmetric and non-linear short-run models. Finally, Section 
5 offers some concluding remarks and provides some policy implications of our 
findings. 
 
2. Tax and spend or spend and tax? 
Public finance theory provides three different models of the relationship 
between general government revenues and expenditure. In particular, according to 
the "spend-and-tax" hypothesis (SAT), the government raises the necessary finances 
to cover its expansionary spending (Peacock and Wiseman, 1979). In Friedman’s 
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(1978) analysis, the government spends all the revenues that is politically able to 
raise, resulting in the "tax-and-spend" model (TAS). The simultaneous model (SIM), 
closer to the public finance tradition, prescribes instead that a benevolent 
government will simultaneously set its revenues and expenditures, to maximize a 
social welfare function (see, e.g. Musgrave 1985). The empirical identification of the 
correct revenue-expenditure pattern is relevant for policymakers in order to identify 
the correct strategies to target fiscal disequilibria. Under SAT, a spending restraint is 
required to reduce public deficits, whereas under TAS, higher taxes will result in 
raising rather than correcting fiscal deficits. Further, fiscal adjustments based on 
expenditures (i.e. the TAS model) can induce a more lasting consolidation of the 
budget and ultimately have an expansionary effect; on the other hand, adjustments 
based on taxes (i.e. the SAT model) are soon reversed by further deteriorations of 
the budget and have contractionary effects on the economy (see e.g. Alesina and 
Perotti 1996, Ardagna 2004).   
The empirical testing of TAS versus SAT has been traditionally based on 
linear models. Restricting our attention to the most recent literature that uses 
cointegration techniques, Baghestani and McNown (1994) reject both the TAS and 
SAT hypotheses for the US. Using data for 9 industrialized countries, Koren and 
Stiassny (1998) find evidence in favor of the SAT hypothesis for Italy, whereas 
Cheng (1999) rejects the SAT hypothesis for eight Latin American countries.  
 Non-linear error correction models have not been applied so far in public 
finance, with the remarkable exception of Sarno (2001), who shows that the US debt 
to GDP ratio becomes increasingly mean reverting for larger deviations from its 
equilibrium levels. Based on non-linear error-correction, our work also differs from 
recent fiscal policy papers. For instance, Giavazzi et al (2000; see also the 
references cited therein) consider the non-linear response of national savings to 
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taxation and spending for a panel of OECD and developing economies based on 
impulse-response analysis. 
Our application of non-linear error-correction techniques allows us to derive 
further policy implications from the revenue-expenditure models. This is done by 
testing for possible downward (or upward) inflexibility of the fiscal variables along 
with the possibility of non-linear fiscal adjustment. In particular, we examine whether 
fiscal authorities react differently to positive and negative deviations of the fiscal 
variables from the long-run equilibrium level. We also test for possible asymmetries 
of the fiscal instruments with respect to the state of the economy. 
 
3. The long-run analysis 
3.1. Data and empirical methodology 
 
 We empirically model the revenue-expenditures patterns of Italy, based on 
annual Italian data over the period 1957 to 2000. Our use of low frequency data 
allows us to capture the discretionary changes in budgetary policy, that would be 
ruled out by higher frequency data (see e.g. Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).  
 We initially test for cointegration between the GDP shares of government 
spending and revenues. We express our revenue-expenditure model as GDP shares, 
given that fiscal policy debates are made in terms of GDP ratios. This is important 
since all productive activities are the basis for revenues and the government sector is 
bounded by the size of the aggregate economy (Bohn, 1991). Given that both 
revenues and spending are highly dependent on aggregate income, our short-run 
models of Section 4 also allow for additional effects from nominal GDP.  
 Cointegration involves estimating the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM; see 
Johansen, 1988) of the form: Ttyyyy ttktktt ,...,1,... 11111 =ε+µ+β′α+∆Γ++∆Γ=∆ −+−−−   
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where yt =
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T , T is the logarithm of nominal general government revenues, 
G is the logarithm of nominal general government expenditure, and GDP is the log of 
nominal gross domestic product. εt are white noise errors and µ is an intercept. The 
(p x r) matrix β contains the r cointegrating vectors. The (p x r) matrix α carries the 
adjustment coefficients in each of the r vectors. We set the lag length k equal to 2 
based on the Akaike Information Criterion. The data set is taken from ISTAT, 
Annuario Statistico Italiano (various issues).  
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ADF tests suggested that both the revenue and the expenditure series are non-
stationary in log-levels. We test for cointegration between revenues and expenditures 
using Johansen’s (1988) maximal eigenvalue (λ-max) and trace (λ-trace) statistics. To 
account for our small sample, both tests use a small sample correction (for exact 
mathematical formulas, see e.g. Doornik and Hendry, 2000, p.282). Both reject the null 
of no cointegration in favor of one cointegrating vector between revenues and 
expenditures1.  
 We can now test some relevant policy questions, namely: (a) is the budget 
balanced in the long run? (b) is fiscal adjustment back to equilibrium equally shared 
by changes in revenues and government spending?, and (c) what is the speed of the 
process of fiscal consolidation? 
 Hypotheses (a) and (b) can be tested via a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, which is 
distributed as a χ2(1) under the null hypotheses of (i) proportionality between revenues 
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and expenditures and (ii) equal adjustment coefficients, respectively. Both hypotheses 
are rejected as the LR gives a value of 6.84 (p-value = 0.00) for the first one and 8.54 
(p-value = 0.00) for the second one. In particular, given that the adjustment coefficient 
on 
GDP
G  is insignificantly different from zero at 1 percent (but not at  5 percent) as the 
LR test gives a value of 5.33 (p-value = 0.02), government share is weakly exogenous 
in our model. We discuss the implication of this further below. Imposing the above 
restriction and normalizing with respect to taxes yields the following long-run 
relationship between the Italian revenues and expenditures (standard error in 
brackets)2:   
GDP
T  = 0.831 
GDP
G  
(0.067) 
 Figure 2 plots the deviations from the estimated (restricted) relationship. 
 
3.2. Policy implications of the long-run analysis 
 What are the economic implications of the above statistical tests? The presence of 
cointegration points to a stable long-run co-movement of the revenues and 
expenditure shares of GDP, in the sense that revenues and expenditures do not 
deviate too much from each other. This is generally interpreted (see, e.g. Trehan and 
Walsh, 1988, Hakkio and Rush 1991, and Quintos, 1995) as evidence for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 The λ-max and λ-trace statistics are equal to 15.5 and 19.4, respectively. These are higher than the 
corresponding 5 percent critical values (i.e. 15.0 and 18.1, respectively). The critical values are taken 
from MacKinnon et al. (1999).  
2 To check the robustness of the estimated long-run results, we also used the fully modified (semi-
parametric) OLS method of Phillips and Hansen (1990) for estimation of a single cointegrating vector 
when there is endogeneity between the T/GDP and G/GDP variables. The Phillips and Hansen (1990) 
procedure provided almost identical results; in particular, the estimate on G/GDP was equal to 0.743 
(standard error=0.047). 
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sustainability of fiscal policy, that is, for the ability of the Italian government to meet 
its intertemporal budget constraint (see e.g. Hamilton and Flavin, 1986). On the other 
hand, rejection of proportionality provides evidence against sustainability in a strict 
sense, as government spending will constantly grow at a higher rate than revenues. 
Therefore, our findings suggest a weak form of sustainability of the Italian public 
finances, meeting the Quintos (1995) sufficient condition. It should also be pointed 
out, that this cointegrating equilibrium does not provide evidence in favor of a fiscal 
discipline in the European Stability and Growth Pact sense; taxes will consistently be 
lower than expenditures, resulting in a positive long-run deficit. Fiscal consolidation 
will therefore need to be seriously tackled by the Italian government, in order to attain 
the ESGP.  
 Weak exogeneity of government spending implies that the short-run adjustment 
to correct budgetary disequilibria is done by changes in tax policy rather than 
changes in government spending or even policy mixes. Government spending is 
exogeneously decided by the political process, with taxes adjusting consequently. 
This result provides strong empirical support to the SAT model3.  
 The speed of the fiscal consolidation process (question (c) above), can be 
inferred from the analysis of the impulse response of the cointegrating relationship to 
system-wide shocks (this is the “persistence profile analysis” in Pesaran and Shin, 
1996). From Figure 3, this converges to zero rather slowly with 90 percent of the 
adjustment completed after 6 years. Deviations from the estimated cointegrating 
relationship are therefore eliminated very slowly, rendering the process of fiscal 
consolidation rather slow. 
                                                          
3 Our result is in line with Koren and Stiassny (1998) for Italy, although they adopt a different empirical 
specification. Our results also empirically corroborate Alesina and Perotti’s (1996) discussion of Italy’s 
fiscal adjustment process. 
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 Slow fiscal adjustment through changes in taxes rather than changes in 
government spending could be related to public expenditure rigidities, not only due to 
multi-annual contracts and planning, but also due to strong resistance against 
expenditure reductions arising both from the demand-side and bureaucratic powers 
(see OECD, 1997, and Legrenzi and Milas, 2002). The political instability of the 
country, typically associated with multi party coalition governments4, renders 
problematic the achievement of the necessary consensus to politically unpopular 
spending cuts, favoring therefore the prevalence of the SAT adjustment, rather than 
a policy mix. The necessary reforms of the welfare state, and of the pensions system 
in particular, although debated for several years, are very slowly put into place, due 
to strong public opposition in the form of widespread general strikes (Reviglio, 2001).  
 Frequent general elections have also undermined the control of public spending 
for electoral purposes5, at least until the early 1990s when more prudent policies 
were put in place in order to meet the Maastricht (1992) convergence criteria (see 
OECD, 1997). The low level of independence of the Italian Central Bank for most of 
the sample considered, also resulted in a soft-budget constraint for the central 
government, favoring expenditure growth (see Koren and Stiassny, 1998). 
 On the other hand, the SAT adjustment (and tax increases in particular) can be 
favored by the presence of fiscal illusion arising from the complexity of the Italian 
fiscal system, therefore resulting in several indirect taxes (see Puviani, 1903, and 
Wagner, 1976). However, this could undermine the progressivity of the fiscal system 
enshrined in the Italian Constitution.  
                                                          
4 For a more detailed analysis of the link between coalition governments and lower fiscal responsibility, 
see Roubini and Sachs (1989), Grilli et al. (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1995). 
5 It is interesting to notice that in the time span considered here, Italian political life saw 43 
governments and 12 general elections. 
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 Other rigidities that could explain the sluggish rate of convergence towards 
equilibrium include a plethora of (often) uncoordinated laws6 that undermine the 
collection of taxes as well as an inadequate monitoring system of public spending; 
public management accountability is underdeveloped, therefore hampering the 
assessment of economic results. For public policies to deliver “value for money”, 
these inefficiencies will need to be seriously tackled by strengthening budgetary 
institutions and procedures. A related issue (that nevertheless goes beyond the 
scope of this paper) relies on the effectiveness of large governments to improve on 
the social welfare of nations. Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) discuss how pressures 
for higher spending come from vested interests rather than from the public interest. 
 A burden of fiscal consolidation entirely carried by taxes has a detrimental 
impact on the economy due to the distortionary and disincentive effect of taxes. 
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) identify tax increases on labour and profits as the main 
cause of declining economic growth and expansion of the shadow economy. This is 
certainly true for Italy where the black market economy accounted for 25.8% of 
official GDP in 1994, against 12.4% for the UK, 14.3% for France and 9.4% for the 
US (see Schneider and Enste, 2000)  
Fiscal consolidation based on tax increases alone, can only be short-lived. 
This is discussed in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) who use a panel of OECD countries 
to show that spending cuts (primarily on public employment and transfers) can make 
the fiscal consolidation process successful. Further, Bertola and Drazen (1993) and 
Sutherland (1997) argue that contrary to the Keynesian wisdom, spending cuts can 
have an expansionary effect on the economy (via their positive impact on consumers’ 
                                                          
6 As the OECD (1997) study for Italy points out, the number of laws in the early 1990s was estimated 
at between 100,000 and 150,000 for Italy, compared to 7,000 in France and 6,000 in Germany.  
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and investors’ expectations, and on the labour market). In particular, Ardagna (2004) 
provides strong empirical evidence on a panel of OECD countries for the “labour 
market hypothesis” of non-Keynesian effects of spending cuts, operating from the 
supply-side by lowering the unions’ power via cuts in government employment, wage 
bills and unemployment benefits. These remarks are more than applicable to the 
high-debt Italian economy, especially in light of Perotti’s (1999) OECD panel analysis 
showing strong evidence of “non-Keynesian” (i.e. expansionary) effects of 
expenditure shocks at high levels of public debt. 
 Given that changes in taxes equilibrate the system, the next section explores 
further the role of asymmetries only along the tax dimension. In particular, we impose 
weak exogeneity of government spending and examine whether positive versus 
negative and large versus small disequilibrium deviations have different effects on 
the short-run behavior of taxes. We also consider possible asymmetries of the tax 
instrument along the economic cycle.  
 
 
4. The short-run model 
4.1. Linear adjustment 
 We initially estimate the short-run adjustment of taxes within a linear error 
correction model, conditional on government spending which is assumed exogenous 
due to political and other reasons mentioned above. The OLS estimates of the 
parsimonious linear error-correction model are reported in Table 1(i). 
 The error-correction coefficient suggests that 14 percent of the disequilibrium error 
is corrected within a year by changes in taxes. Further, short-run increases in 
government expenditure have a positive effect on taxes. On the other hand, lagged 
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∆ ⎟⎠
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⎛
GDP
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛
GDP
T
                                                          
 regressors turn out to be insignificant. Overall, our short-run 
estimates provide further empirical support for the SAT model7. 
 To account for the possibility of European Monetary Union effects, we also tried a 
dummy variable, taking the value of 1 from 1993 (when the Maastricht Treaty was 
agreed) onwards and 0 elsewhere. The dummy variable turned out to be statistically 
insignificant, implying that the adjustment of the Italian public finances did not take 
place through structural changes in the revenue-expenditure patterns. This result is 
particularly important, considered together with the positive long-run deficit, 
emphasizing the need for more structural reforms in the Italian public finances8.  
 To capture the effects of economic and accelerating economic growth we also 
considered current and lagged values of ∆GDP and ∆2GDP as extra regressors. We 
found some significant effect from ∆2GDPt-1 only in the non-linear error correction 
model reported in the following section. This result has to do with the complexity of 
the relationship among revenues, expenditures, and income, that can only be 
partially captured by a multivariate econometric model. In particular, together with 
Keynesian multiplier and Wagner’s law effects, a decreasing economic growth 
triggers the generous system of automatic stabilizers for the Italian welfare state. For 
this reason, we consider below possible asymmetries of tax policy with respect to the 
state of the economy.   
 
7 As our results suggest a feedback from ∆(G/GDP) to the ∆(T/GDP) model, we avoid reference to 
Granger causality running from spending on taxes. The latter would suggest a feedback from lags of 
∆(G/GDP) rather than ∆(G/GDP) itself on taxes.  
8 Italy qualified to the European Monetary Union despite failing the debt criterion. Economic 
adjustment was mainly driven by changes in monetary policy. In 1997, a “European tax” was imposed 
on private households, as a one-off measure, and some “budgetary gimmicks” were used in order to 
qualify for the deficit criterion (see e.g. Reviglio, 2001). 
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4.2. Asymmetric and non-linear adjustment 
 We now examine how the fiscal authorities use tax policy in order to correct 
budgetary disequilibria by estimating asymmetric and non-linear error correction 
models. 9 10  
 The asymmetric error correction model is obtained by taking the deviations of the 
cointegrating vector CVt – 1 around its mean value, and partitioning them into their 
positive and negative components (denoted by CV+t – 1 and CV-t – 1, respectively). 
Results for the parsimonious asymmetric error-correction model are reported in Table 
1(ii).  The results indicate that the speed of adjustment varies depending on whether the 
estimated relationship is above or below its equilibrium. The point estimates suggest 
that when taxes are lower than equilibrium, they increase rapidly. On the other hand, 
when taxes are higher than equilibrium, they fall slowly. Nevertheless, equality of the 
coefficients on CV+t – 1 and CV-t – 1 is not rejected based on an F-test (p-value= 0.78). 
Hence, in economic terms our results point to downward inflexibility of taxes. 
Nevertheless, in terms of statistical tests, these results are not clear-cut. 
To obtain the non-linear error correction model, we add to the linear model of Table 
1(i) the squared and cubed values of the error-correction regressor, that is, CV2t – 1 and 
CV3t – 1. This type of non-linearity allows for a faster adjustment when deviations from 
the equilibrium level get larger. Results for the parsimonious non-linear error correction 
are reported in Table 1(iii). The p-value of the F test for the statistical significance of the 
CV3t – 1 regressor is equal to 0.02, indicating (at the 5 percent level of statistical 
significance) that adjustment back to equilibrium is stronger for large disequilibrium 
                                                          
9 Before estimating asymmetric and non-linear models, we tested and found significant non-linearities in 
the residuals of the linear error correction model using the Brock, Dechert and Sheinkman (BDS, 
1996) test statistic. The test is also discussed in Escribano (2004).  
10 Asymmetric and non-linear error correction models have been introduced by Escribano (1986). See 
also Granger and Lee (1989), Escribano and Granger (1998), Escribano and Pfann (1998), Escribano 
and Aparicio (1999), Escribano (2002), and Escribano and Mira (2002), amongst others. 
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deviations. On the other hand, the p-value of the F test for the joint significance of the 
CV2t – 1 and CV3t – 1 regressors is equal to 0.06, which is significant only at the 10 
percent level. We also report a weak positive effect on taxes from lagged accelerating 
economic growth, possibly capturing the built-in progressivity of the fiscal system.  
We return to this issue more in detail below. 
Figure 4a and Figure 4b plot the asymmetric and non-linear adjustments against 
the cointegrating vector, respectively. Figure 4a provides evidence of asymmetric 
adjustment of taxes; deviations above equilibrium are corrected more slowly than 
deviations below equilibrium. On the other hand, we notice from Figure 4b that once 
disequilibrium deviations get larger, adjustment back to equilibrium becomes stronger.  
To assess further the differences amongst the estimated models, we take a closer 
look at the contribution of the error correction terms to changes in the tax share of GDP. 
To do this, we plot in Figure 5 the values of the error correction components of the 
linear, asymmetric and non-linear equations across time. The linear and asymmetric 
error correction effects are fairly similar. This is not surprising given the weak evidence 
of asymmetric adjustment reported in Table 1(ii). On the other hand, the non-linear 
model error corrects strongly relative to the linear and asymmetric models. This is 
particularly true (i) during periods of “macroeconomic stress” associated with the oil 
price shocks of the mid and late 1970s when taxes adjusted downwards to provide 
some tax relief, and (ii) in 1997, when taxes adjusted upwards following the imposition 
of a one-off “European tax” bill in an attempt to help Italy satisfy the Maastricht fiscal 
criterion. 
The presence of these asymmetries suggests the opportunity of analyzing further 
the behavior of taxes in different phases of the economic cycle. In particular, we 
investigate the possibility of asymmetric effects from accelerating and decreasing 
economic growth on taxes, given the weak positive effect from lagged accelerating 
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growth (∆2GDPt-1) on taxes reported in Table 1(iii). For this purpose, we partition 
∆2GDPt-1 into its positive and negative components (denoted by  ∆2GDP+t–1 and  
∆2GDP-t–1, respectively). Then we re-estimate the non-linear model of Table 1(iii) where 
we replace ∆2GDPt–1 with ∆2GDP+t–1 and ∆2GDP-t–1 as separate regressors. The 
coefficient on ∆2GDP+t–1 is estimated at 0.403 (t-ratio = 1.20). The coefficient on 
∆2GDP-t–1 is estimated at 0.087 (t-ratio = 0.16) whereas the estimates of the remaining 
regressors are almost identical to those of Table 1(iii). GDP symmetry is not rejected 
based on an F-test (F=0.40, p-value = 0.52). On the other hand, the joint hypothesis of 
symmetric GDP effects and linear error correction adjustment (in terms of zero effects 
from CV2t – 1 and CV3t – 1 ) is rejected at 10 percent (F=2.86, p-value= 0.07). Hence, 
there is some evidence of downward inflexibility of taxes during periods of decreasing 
economic growth as the coefficient on ∆2GDP-t–1 is four times lower than the coefficient 
on ∆2GDP+t–1, which in turn is statistically insignificant. We believe that this result 
deserves more attention and possibly further analysis in the direction of planning an 
adequate strategy of tax-smoothing (although the latter is further constrained by the 
high level of public debt).  
Figure 6 plots the time varying contribution of the linear and asymmetric GDP 
effects on taxes. Compared with linear GDP effects, asymmetries along the economic 
cycle reveal higher tax increases during “good times” due to the progressivity of the 
fiscal system, but lower tax reductions during “bad times”.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the Italian public finances between 
1957 and 2000. We find a long-run relationship between the government spending 
share of GDP and the revenues share of GDP resulting in a positive deficit. Short-run 
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adjustment to correct budgetary disequilibria is done entirely by changes in taxes, 
rather than spending cuts or policy mixes. This finding supports the spend-and-tax 
hypothesis. The persistence profile analysis suggests a sluggish rate of convergence 
towards equilibrium. This could be related to the existence of a complicated 
budgetary system that adds to the sluggishness in the collection of taxes and 
undermines the effective monitoring of public spending. We also find that taxes adjust 
more rapidly when deviations from the equilibrium level get larger. Further, there is 
some weak evidence of downward inflexibility of taxes during periods of decreasing 
economic growth and during periods where taxes are above their long-run level with 
government expenditure.  
 Taking into account that taxation carries the burden of correcting budgetary 
disequilibria, a simplified structure of the tax system, despite offsetting fiscal illusion 
effects, would increase the speed with which deviations from the estimated long-run 
spending - revenues relation are eliminated. Nevertheless, progress towards fiscal 
consolidation cannot rely solely on tax pressure due to possible distortionary effects 
arising from the downward inflexibility of taxes. This is also discussed in Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) who argue that successful fiscal adjustment in OECD countries results 
from spending cuts rather than tax increases. A higher degree of government 
expenditure adjustment would also relax the asymmetries reported in our paper. 
 Our work can be extended in several ways. Teräsvirta (1998) pointed out that 
non-linear models with quadratic and cubic error correction terms are first-order 
approximations to smooth transition autoregression models, where the transition 
mechanism between different regimes is driven by the disequilibrium error. In the 
context of our public finance model, it would be interesting to estimate a two-regime 
smooth transition model where adjustment takes place in every period but the speed 
of the adjustment as well as the impact of the lagged values of expenditure and taxes 
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vary conditional on whether disequilibrium deviations from the expenditure/taxes 
relationship are large or small.  
 It would also be interesting to examine whether non-linear adjustment can be 
elevated into a stylized fact, by considering tax and government spending adjustment 
in other countries, as well as at a local government level. If it can, then non-linearities 
in taxes and spending might be incorporated into existing non-linear models of fiscal 
policy (see e.g. Giavazzi et al., 2000). We intend to address these issues in future 
research.  
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Table 1: OLS estimates of alternative error correction models for ∆ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
GDP
T  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
 Linear model Asymmetric model Non-linear model 
    
Constant   0.008  (1.163)   0.004  (0.272)   0.012  (1.039) 
∆ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
GDP
G
t
  0.390  (4.609)   0.393  (4.553)   0.450  (5.296) 
CV t-1  -0.137 (-2.533)   -   0.097  (0.880) 
CV2 t-1   -   -  -0.079 (-0.172) 
CV3 t-1   -   -  -7.287 (-2.412) 
CV+ t-1   -  -0.105  (-0.824)   - 
CV- t-1   -  -0.172  (-1.230)   - 
∆2GDPt-1   -   -   0.234  (1.641) 
    
Diagnostics    
Regression s.e.   0.047   0.047   0.044 
2R    0.418   0.419   0.513 
Far    0.42 [0.66]   0.48 [0.61]   0.67 [0.51] 
Farch    0.08 [0.76]   0.03 [0.86]   0.74 [0.39] 
χ2nd    4.58 [0.10]   1.11 [0.37]   5.47 [0.06] 
F test of equal CV+t-1 
and CV-t-1 effects  
  -   0.07 [0.78]   - 
F test of zero effect 
from CV3t-1
  -   -   5.85 [0.02] 
F test of zero effects 
from CV2t-1 and CV3t-1
  -   -   3.03 [0.06] 
 
Notes: T-ratios in parentheses. Far is the Lagrange Multiplier F-test for 2nd order serial 
correlation. Farch is the 1st order ARCH F-test. χ2nd is a Chi-square test for normality. 
Numbers in square brackets are the p-values of the tests. 2R is the adjusted coefficient 
of determination.  CV = T / GDP – 0.831 G / GDP, in mean corrected form. 
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 Figure 1: Plots of the log-levels and the first differences of the series 
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 Figure 2: Long-run relationship: CV = T / GDP – 0.831 G / GDP 
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Figure 3: Persistence profile of the cointegrating vector to system-wide shocks 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
 
Time horizon 
 
 
 23
Figure 4: Asymmetric and non-linear adjustment 
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Notes: CVAS = -0.105CV+ -0.172CV-, CVNL = 0.097CV - 0.079CV2 –7.287CV3.  
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Figure 5: Error correction components of the linear, asymmetric and non-linear 
models for ∆ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
GDP
T  
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Notes: CVAS = -0.105CV+ -0.172CV-, CVNL = 0.097CV - 0.079CV2 –7.287CV3,  
CVLIN = -0.137CV 
 
 
Figure 6: Linear and asymmetric GDP effects on taxes 
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Notes: D2GDP_AS = 0.403∆2GDP+ +0.087∆2GDP-,   D2GDP_LIN = 0.234∆2GDP.  
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